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Abstract. The increasing integration of technology into our lives has
created unprecedented volumes of data on society’s everyday behav-
iour. Such data opens up exciting new opportunities to work towards a
quantitative understanding of our complex social systems, within the
realms of a new discipline known as Computational Social Science.
Against a background of financial crises, riots and international epi-
demics, the urgent need for a greater comprehension of the complexity
of our interconnected global society and an ability to apply such in-
sights in policy decisions is clear. This manifesto outlines the objectives
of this new scientific direction, considering the challenges involved in
it, and the extensive impact on science, technology and society that
the success of this endeavour is likely to bring about.
1 Objectives and opportunities
In a world of demographic explosion, global crises, ethnic and religious disturbances
and increasing crime the understanding of the structure and function of society, as
well as the nature of its changes, is crucial for governance and for the well being of
people. Humanity is currently facing grand challenges. Setting aside environmental
issues and the depletion of natural resources, we have to cope with formidable social
and political problems:
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– Change of the population structure (change of birth rate, migration);
– Financial and economic instability (trust, consumption and investments; sovereign
debt, taxation, and inflation/deflation; sustainability of social welfare systems, and
so on);
– Social, economic and political divide (among people of different gender, age, edu-
cation, income, religion, culture, language, preferences);
– Threats against health (due to the spreading of epidemics, but also to unhealthy
diets and habits);
– Unbalance of power in a multi-polar world;
– Organized crime, including cyber-crime, social unrest and war;
– Uncertainty in institutional design and dynamics (regarding regulations, authority,
corruption, balance between global and local, central and decentralized systems);
– Unethical usage of communication and information systems (cyber risks, violation
of privacy, misuse of sensitive data, spam).
In the last couple of years, social scientists have started to organize and classify the
number, variety, and severity of criticalities, if not pathologies and failures, recurring
in complex social systems [1,2]. These are amongst the most severe social problems,
difficult to predict and treat, and raising serious social alarm.
Furthermore, human society has never before changed as fast as it is changing to-
day. Technological development has opened entirely new channels of communication,
induced new behavioural patterns, substantially influenced organization principles,
and its products are becoming history-forming factors. We human beings have pre-
served our basic, genetically determined biological properties over tens of thousands
of years but our social behaviour seems to be altered with an unprecedented speed,
continuously challenging our adaptivity.
Part of the difficulty for us to respond to the challenges mentioned above is inher-
ent to fundamental features of social complexity. Complex social systems are char-
acterised by multiple ontological levels with multidirectional connections, proceeding
not only from the micro to the macroscopic levels but also back from the macro
to the micro-levels [3]. Furthermore, complex social systems present a far-reaching
and accelerated diffusion of phenomena, behaviours and cultural traits. Accelerated
contagion leads on one hand to new systems’ properties emerging at the aggregate
level – for example new public opinions and political movements, new global and
local identities, collective preferences, attitudes, even moods, etc. – and on the other
to major critical event in the social economic and/or political spheres, such as global
financial crises and the collapse of regimes.
Finally, complex social systems do often show interdependences and interferences
among their properties and processes of transformation. The interplay between cul-
tural and biological evolution shows unexpected intricacies, far from the parallel pre-
dicted by the Dual Inheritance Theory [4], as shown by the Demographic Transition
(DT) model [5]. Based on an interpretation of demographic history developed in 1929
by the American demographer Warren Thompson, the DT model points to a growing
gap between economic and demographic growth: all over the world, the higher the
average income of the population the lower its birth rate.
These problems depend on the same circumstances that might help us find solu-
tions: a high degree of poorly understood and poorly investigated technology-driven
innovation. ICT applications seem to act both in favour and against our capacity
to answer the grand challenges before us. The widespread access to the Internet is
seriously and often positively impacting the frequency, range and style of human
communication and interaction, leading to heterogeneous interconnected networks.
Electronic communications seem to have played a fundamental role in the diffusion
and organization of the protest movements arising in Northern Africa, and leading
to regime change. At the same time, the view that social networks connect people is
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oversimplified, and the question remains open as to what types of connections are es-
tablished among them, whether, for example, pro or antisocial, and – since resources
like time are limited – to the expense of what and of whom. The alternative offered by
Internet to the hierarchical organization of cultural production and specialised profes-
sional advice pushes up symmetrical, horizontal interactions. At the same time, the
Open Source community challenges the foundation of intellectual property as well
as the institution of truth certification. Are these effects only signs of providential
progress? What about the nature and functioning of economic, cultural and political
institutions? What about the credibility of the information spread and its effective
truth-value?
That much for the negative side of the coin. But there is also a positive side.
Information and communication technologies can greatly enhance the possibility to
uncover the laws of the society. First, ICT produces a flood of data. These data
represent traces of almost all kinds of activities of individuals enabling an entirely new
scientific approach for social analysis. Second, the development of computer capacities
makes it possible to handle the data deluge and to invent models that reflect the
diversity and complexity of the society.
The analysis of huge data sets as obtained, say, from mobile phone calls, social
networks, or commercial activities provides insight into phenomena and processes at
the societal level. Investigating peoples’ electronic footprints did already contribute
to understand the relationship between the structure of the society and the intensity
of relationships [6] and the way pandemic diseases spread [7], as well as to identify
the main laws of human communication behaviour [8].
The traditional tools of social sciences would at most scratch the surface of
these issues, whereas new tools can shed light onto social behaviour from totally
different angles. Possibilities ranging from supercomputers to distributed computing
make the execution of large-scale, heterogeneous multi-agent programs possible, pro-
grams which prove particularly apt to model the complexity of social and behavioural
systems.
The new ICT-enabled study of society has been named computational social sci-
ence [9]. This is a truly interdisciplinary approach, where social and behavioural sci-
entists, cognitive scientists, agent theorists, computer scientists, mathematicians and
physicists cooperate side-by-side to come up with innovative and theory-grounded
models of the target phenomena. Computational social scientists strongly believe
that a new era has started in the understanding of the structure and function of our
society at different levels [9].
On the one hand, computational social science is aimed to favour and take ad-
vantage of massive ICT data. On the other, it is a model-based science yielding both
predictive and explanatory models. Hence, it is intended to profit from the modelling
instruments made available by ICT for producing generative models of large-scale
multi-agent systems. Both objectives must be achieved to turn social science into
applicable tools that can inform decision makers about issues of major concern.
In this paper, we will work towards the drafting of a Manifesto for the new
Computational Social Science.
The paper will unfold as follows: in the next section, the state of the art of the field
will be discussed. In the third section, its main characteristics will be examined. In the
fourth section, the main challenges the new field is facing will be addressed. Finally,
in the fifth section, we will turn our attention to compare and discuss the types of
models that are compatible or necessary for a computational social scientific program
as outlined in the previous part of the paper. Final considerations will conclude the
paper, but not the process to constitute the new discipline, that for a Computational
Social Science is an inherently dynamic scientific program. This paper is only part of
the beginning of it.
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2 State of the art
2.1 Emergent phenomena at the aggregate level
The computational study of social phenomena has been focused on the emergence of
all sorts of collective phenomena and behaviours from among individual systems in
interaction – including segregation [10], cooperation [11], reciprocity [13], social norms
[14–17], institutions [18], etc. Let us briefly re-examine the major research directions.
Emergent social behaviour. The study of emergent social behaviour did greatly
benefit from computational and simulation-based modelling. Although even phenom-
ena like civil violence and rebellion have been investigated [19], computational mod-
elling has so far been mainly applied to behaviours like altruism, cooperation and
norm conformity.
The study of altruism has generally been cast into the evolutionary framework.
However, computational studies of the cultural dimension of this phenomenon exist
– see the economy of [20,21]; cf. later on in the paper, 4.1.3.
While the perspective in which the study of cooperation is generally framed is
game theoretic, the current frontiers in the computational study of cooperation arise
in other formal fields, like complex systems science. Socio-semantic systems dragged
the attention of the scientific community to investigate quantitatively how cooperative
phenomena emerge and can be harnessed to improve the performance of collective
tasks [22–24].
The most insightful computational studies of altruism are due to Nowak and
Sigmund Nowak and Sigmund 1998, who had the merit, among others, to point out
the role of image scoring in the evolution of donation. In turn, image scoring gave
impulse to the study of reputation (for two recent reviews see Walker [26] and Ebbers
and Wijnberg [27] in the emergence of cooperation from repeated interaction (the so
called shadow of the future, [28]) and from networks of interconnected agents [29].
Thanks to its evolutionary background, the computational modelling of prosocial
behaviour was aimed to identify the distal causes of altruism and cooperation, i.e.,
their impact on the individual and the social group’s chances for survival. One of
the principal directions of investigation of the distal causes of cooperation concerned
strong reciprocity, i.e., the spontaneous attitude to punish free-riders. Evolutionary
game theorists showed the positive effect of strong reciprocity on both the cooper-
ators’ and the groups’ fitness by simulating artificial hunter-gatherers populations.
The missed point in the evolutionary study of prosocial behaviour is the proximate
causes, i.e., the behavioural and mental mechanisms on which reciprocity is imple-
mented. Evolutionary theories point to the competitive advantage (distal cause) of
the behaviours to explain, leaving aside the question of how they could have ever
appeared in the behavioural repertoire of a species (proximate cause). The applica-
tion of computational methodologies to study also the proximate causes represents a
major challenge for the future computational social science.
Emergent social aggregates. The best known and most influential work in this
area is Schelling’s seminal paper on segregation [10], which gave impulse to a great
deal of computational studies of emergent structures at the aggregate level (see e.g.
[30–32]). Computational studies of spontaneous group formation and the emergence
of coalitions and collective entities are also at study among social scientists and game
theorists since long [33]. This research direction had the merit to point out the role
of extortion and tribute as mechanisms of political coalition formation.
However, no much attention was given to the opposite direction of influence, i.e.,
downward causation or second order emergence [34,35]. Furthermore, the study of
emerging phenomena at the aggregate level not always shed light on the foundations of
social structures. Social networks, for example, are investigated by the properties they
Participatory Science and Computing for Our Complex World 329
exhibit once they have emerged (e.g., scale-freeness). Instead, poor attention has been
paid so far to the conditions favouring, and allowing to predict, the emergence of social
networks (see [36] and later on in this paper, 4.1.2). Agent-based modellers have begun
to address this issue and to study the link between fundamental behavioural processes,
social conditions, and the macroscopic structure of emergent complex networks [37].
Emergent institutions. While the study of emergent social behaviour has mainly
addressed positive social action, a wide spectrum of institutions has been observed
to emerge in computational environments, from the market [38] to money [39]; from
social organization [40] to the modern state [41].
As to theoretical frameworks, the study of emerging conventions and social norms
[14,19,42–44] is greatly indebted to the game theoretic framework and to the philo-
sophical bases of the rationality theory [16,45]. Nonetheless, agent-based models of
norm emergence have been developed by authors not committed to a rational view
of agency [46–48]. The study of norm emergence turned out to be one of the most
prolific domains of investigation of computational social science. Nonetheless, a num-
ber of questions have been left open, the most important of which perhaps is how to
account for norm compliance.
In sum, the study of emergent phenomena has largely profited from the adop-
tion of computational methodologies. Rather than conclusive, however, the results
obtained so far indicate new promising directions of research, in particular, (a) the
micro-foundations of social structures and networks; (b) the proximate causes in evo-
lutionary explanation, i.e., the internal mechanisms that contribute to explain the
advantages of the target behaviours for the individual and for the group and (c) the
way back in the dynamics of emergent phenomena like norms and institutions, and
how they manage to be adopted by executors. These are all important challenges for a
field, like computational social science, that has the potential to re-found the science
of society.
2.2 Social learning systems and mechanisms
Rather than a topic of investigation per se, learning is a property on which a great
deal of computational social science builds upon (see N 4.5 Democratising Big Data,
Complexity Modelling and Collective Intelligence). All sorts of social dynamics are at-
tributed to learning processes, based on direct reinforcement or imitation. Replicator
dynamics has been strongly influential in the study of social and economic processes,
and still is one of the techniques on which computational models of social dynamics
are implemented.
Despite the conceptual and theoretical weaknesses of the models and techniques
used, learning systems have had a strongly innovative effect on the study of social
influence, yielding some of the most brilliant results ever achieved by computational
social science so far. One example is the out-of-equilibrium economy (see [49]; see
also the non-equilibrium social science of Hales and Johnson, in which what matters
is not the equilibrium obtained, but how it is obtained. Learning is a fundamental
mechanism that may lead, but not necessarily, to achieve an equilibrium under specific
conditions. As shown by Arthur’s agent-based model of an artificial rudimentary stock
market, the possibility to achieve an equilibrium depends on the speed of the learning
process: the faster the process, the more unstable the equilibrium. Under special
conditions, the non-linear and inconsistent effects of learning become paradoxical:
for instance, in the minority game [50], people adjust their behaviour to their own
expectations concerning certain events. However, while adjusting their behaviour,
people modify the expected conditions, somehow contributing to disconfirm their
expectations. This problem, which has received a great deal of attention in the last
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couple of decades, shows the paradoxical effects of learning and the complex, out-of-
equilibrium character of complex problems. Further computational work has revealed
how learning dynamics can lead to solutions of the problem of cooperation that are
out-of-equilibrium from a rational actor perspective, but may be robust when agents
are boundedly rational [51]. The non-equilibrium phenomena generated by learning
dynamics are a decisive battlefield for computational social science.
2.3 Quantitative computational social science
Computational social science, in terms of agent-based models (ABM), has existed for
a few years. To date, it has been used more as a qualitative tool, e.g., to provide
plausible explanations to social phenomena [52]. However, much effort has recently
been made towards achieving a more quantitative orientation of this kind of research,
and advances have been made in several important directions.
One important topic in this line of research is the assessment of the validity of
simulations: As Gilbert [34] put it:
“You should assume that, no matter how carefully you have designed and built
your simulation, it will contain bugs (code that does something different to what you
wanted and expected).”
Techniques to verify the correctness of the code have been developed and are in-
creasingly used [53] including, for instance, comparison of simplified versions of the
model with analytical results or duplication of simulations in different machines, lan-
guages or both. Less progress has been made, though, towards simulations that can
be quantitatively compared with specific social phenomena, and validation (i.e., as-
sessing the validity of a model by the extent that it provides a satisfactory range of
accuracy consistent with its intended application) is often only qualitative. Quantita-
tive validation will require detailed explorations of the parameter space that, in turn,
would call for appropriate computational facilities, such as grid computing; these
would bring back the issue of code verification. Suitable quantities for meaningful
comparisons need to be identified and measured in the social context of interest (or
at least in controlled experiments). These are crucial steps that need to be carefully
addressed if computational science, and in particular model simulation, are to be
really quantitative.
A second relevant problem with which computational social science is dealing in
its progress towards becoming quantitative is massive data analysis. In addition to the
computational requirements, common to all the questions mentioned in this section,
the design and implementation of efficient and reliable analysis algorithms is at the
core of the research efforts these days. Examples like the controversy on reports of
contagion of obesity in social networks [54,55] clearly show the importance of rigor in
analyzing data in a meaningful way, allowing to distinguish between factors leading
to certain behaviors and to identify causation when possible. Important progress has
here been made by methods that tackle the problem of statistically modeling complex
and interdependent dynamics of behavior and networks with integrating agent-based
simulation techniques with statistical approaches for parameter selection [56]. The
further development of these approaches becomes even more acute when data are so
massive as to prevent the use of well-known algorithms, something that is become
more and more frequent as new sources of data become available.
Finally and importantly, the previous topic is certainly related with data driven
simulations, carried out to compare with, understand, and if possible predict real-life
phenomena. Simulation models such as ABMs can be constructed to support persis-
tent run-time interactions between computer agents and real-world entities via general
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types of input-output data streams [57]. In this way, ABMs become data-driven dy-
namic applications systems [58] entailing the ability to incorporate additional data
into an executable application and, vice versa, the ability of applications to dynami-
cally steer the measurement process. Again, the computational and ICT requirements
to augment this kind of approach with massive sources of data to simulate large social
groups are enormous, and research along this line is at the forefront of the field right
now.
3 Innovative approach: How to characterise the field
of computational social science
Are we well equipped to tackle the BigProblems mentioned above? Undoubtedly, we
are developing valuable instruments and techniques for generating, gathering, and
analysing data about grand challenges, but how about BigThinking, grand theories
matching grand challenges? Theories grow slowly, impeded by entrenched assump-
tions and lack of data. The large-scale, founding constructs that should drive our
understanding of society are debated and misunderstood. In social sciences, there is
no consensus on the general mechanisms that underlie phenomena like institutions,
norm compliance and enforcement, reputation, trust, etc. Even cooperation, one of
the most studied aspects of social interaction, is still locked between free riding and
punishment. With Putterman [11], we believe that important social dilemmas can
only be solved if:
“The human sociality that evolved in our small-group past is robust enough to
overcome the ever-present temptations to free ride”.
How can we understand and help manage complex social systems if we still do
not understand the basics of sociality? Is the new world of automated information
treatment going to provide any help?
The answer is: yes, ICT can provide significant help for social science. Not only
ICT can help access, analyse and build upon BigData, i.e. new type of massive data,
for addressing BigProblems. It can also help provide instruments for BigThinking.
Indeed, computational social science can be characterised along two main aspects,
which both take advantage, one way or the other, from ICT developments: a) BigData,
and b) the role of computation in inspiring, formalizing and implementing the core
scientific concepts, principles, and ideas of computational social science.
3.1 BigData
Computational social science is intended to process data and run simulations at plan-
etary scale, where up to the whole world population is considered, in order to get a
better understanding of global social dynamics. This makes sense in a more and more
interconnected world, where the events occurring in one place can have tremendous
consequences on the other side of the globe [12]. For instance, migrations, the diffu-
sion of diseases, the consumption or production of goods should now all be considered
at planetary scale and involve the whole world population.
The latest evolution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has
increasingly concerned the inclusion of users in the production of information. Nowa-
days, users are not only able to exchange messages, images and sounds with other
individual peers, but also with whole communities whose size and composition can
be defined and tuned by the user him/herself. Moreover, the digital paradigm has al-
lowed the integration of multiple information and communication sources, including
connected PCs, phones and cameras. Accordingly, the distinction between consumers
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and producers of information, typical of a past era dominated by newspapers and
television, is vanishing.
Such an interconnected communication network has dramatically enlarged the
access to information sources with an undeniable advantage for the citizenship. At
the same time, it is presenting new challenges. Information broadcast by uncontrolled
sources could overload the network with noisy signals, preventing the meaningful ones
from being received by the desirable recipients. As a consequence, users’ attention
could be exhausted by useless information.
To overcome obstacles to the use of this increased amount of data, a number of
technologies have been developed. More sophisticated communication platforms have
emerged, up to current Web 2.0 social networks accessible from PCs and cell phones
where users can collectively categorize and evaluate the content they browse, provid-
ing the community with an efficient information filter. The classification of digital
resources is typically performed by assigning labels (or tags) or scores to resources.
This collaborative categorization has given birth to several web-based folksonomies.
Consequently, the most popular websites now incorporate some sort of collaborative
categorization tools.
This ICT infrastructure has been applied not only to favour data exchange among
people, but also to outsource productive tasks. The main difference between this form
of crowdsourcing and traditional labour markets lies in the absence of prearranged
duties that workers deal with an idiosyncratic effort, while the infrastructure takes
care of summing up all contributions despite the heterogeneity and number of users.
First examples have concerned highly specialized tasks, such as open source software
development or scientific programs [59] that could be broken into smaller operations
performed by uncoordinated volunteers. More recently, the range of activities being
crowdsourced has expanded and forms a world-wide labour market facing tasks pro-
posed by various agencies and companies asking, e.g., for technological and marketing
solutions, or by research groups looking for volunteers for test and data mining ac-
tivities [60,61]. These kinds of infrastructures, therefore, are particularly appropriate
for the involvement of citizens in distributed sensing experiments [62,63].
Devices employed to get connected to communication networks have converged
in size and technological standards, expanding more and more the availability of an
Internet connection throughout daily life. Thus, users can now easily form dedicated
networks providing data that monitor particular issues. Such sensing networks can
be of an opportunistic or participatory type.
The participation of users in the monitoring affects both the resolution and the
quality of the data collected. Traditional sensing generally involves a small num-
ber of highly controlled observation points. The low spatial resolution of the data
gathered in this way is compensated by the high data quality certified by the con-
trolling agency. On the other hand, distributed sensing relies on the possibility of
gathering large amounts of data from many uncontrolled sources, which cannot en-
sure high data quality standards; however, by means of statistical methods together
with the possibility of storing and post-processing large datasets, this quality gap
with respect to traditional sensing can be overcome. Reasonably, users provide larger
quantities of data if the observed phenomenon and its management directly concern
the community involved in participatory sensing experiments. For example, people
might be interested in reporting meteorological observations in order to improve ex-
isting models and receive more accurate weather forecasts, and this, as a virtuous
feedback, could be a reason for a citizen to provide more data to meteorological
centres.
For all these reasons, the application of a novel ICT-based sensing framework
may have a stronger impact here than in other areas, since the knowledge of the
underlying social interaction is crucial from many points of view: the quality of the
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environment is strongly affected by the behaviour of individuals in their most ordinary
daily situations; citizens’ behaviour, in turn, depends on their awareness; many bad
environmental practices arise when citizens do not coordinate in order to attain a
global optimal usage of collective resources, but rather pursue their own profit selfishly
– resulting in an even worse long term individual performance.
Hence, the field of computational social science is characterised as a new field of
science in which new type of data, largely made available by new ICT applications, can
be used to produce large-scale computational models of social phenomena. However,
the new field is not only characterised by new data at higher levels of temporal and
spatial scale, but also by new principles and concepts.
3.2 Core scientific concepts and ideas
Computational social science is a powerful tool for fostering our understanding of the
complexities of real socio-economic systems, by building “virtual computational social
worlds” that we can analyze, experiment with, feed with and test against empirical
data on a hitherto unprecedented scale. A range of excellent papers has been written
to make this point (e.g., [9]).
Computational models provide quantitative and qualitative models of social phe-
nomena. One critical application is generative explanations (see 4.4.2), in the form
of computer code, that reproduce some key features of societies. Hence, agent-based
modelling (multi-agent systems) plays a central role in computational social science,
because people (i.e., agents) are the primary subjects of social theories. Social science
is about how people think (psychology), handle wealth (economics), relate to each
other (sociology), govern themselves (political science), and create culture (anthro-
pology). Agentification is the process of formalizing a social theory as an agent-based
model.
Themind – beliefs, desires, intentions, values, and their processes – is at the root of
human social complexity. Cognitive science and social psychology are both necessary
for computational social science. Agent-based models benefit from richer cognitive
architectures, depending on specific modelling goals. For a specific discussion on this
see Sect. 4.
Computational social science is applied to real-world societies. These must be
complex or could not exist, because a set of critical functions is necessary for every
community to operate and endure. Computational social science is aimed to pay
attention not only and not primarily to variables and equations, but to the entities the
social world consists primarily of, i.e., people, ideas, human-made artefacts, and their
relations within ecosystems. These entities are modelled as computational objects
that encapsulate attributes and dynamics.
Another crucial idea of computational social science is adaptation. Social complex-
ity results from human adaptation to challenging environments (Simon’s Principle).
Social complexity as an emergent phenomenon is caused by successful adaptation.
Coupled socio-natural and socio-technical systems are typical examples of complex
adaptation.
Social complexity can be caused by uncertainty, which is commonly misunderstood
as something that cannot be known. We need to understand uncertainty and related
ideas (e.g., inequality, entropy). Probability and other scientific theories of uncertainty
(for example theory-driven models of opinion formation, revision and dynamics in
interplay with other mental constructs, like beliefs) are essential for understanding
social complexity.
The possibility of social change is ubiquitous and important in social life. Noth-
ing social occurs “out of the blue,” without antecedents. What may happen is as
important for social complexity as what has happened.
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Scaling is another crucial aspect of computational social science. The scaling typ-
ical of a power law (“80-20 Rule”) follows a pattern of “many-some-rare”. Income,
wealth, conflicts, organizations, cities, and other features of social life obey power
laws. The first discoveries of power laws occurred in social science, not physics. Com-
putational social theories and agent-based models are capable of producing power
laws and other real-world social distributions. Not all scaling is the same; some cases
are special because of their criticality. Social scientists were not the first to recognize
criticality; physicists did. Criticality is insightful for some social phenomena (e.g.,
conflict), but still puzzling for others.
One of the most interesting aspects of social life is out-of-equilibrium. Most social
distributions are not Gaussian, or bell-shaped. They are often heavy-tailed, power-
law (Pareto), Weibull (exponential, Rayleigh, others), log-normal. Natural raw data
reflects the typical disequilibrium of social complexity – “normalizing” data using a-
theoretical transformations (for regression analysis) may destroy valuable information
about generative processes. Networks account for much of social complexity. One of
the problems is to understand different properties of networks that determine their
emergence (see 3.1.2). Social network analysis (SNA) investigates systems of social
relations, from cognition to the global system. Computational social science allies of
SNA include agent-based modelling, complexity models, and visualization analytics.
Future research directions must include maturation of existing knowledge – both
deeper and more interdisciplinary – as well as new knowledge creation through compu-
tational methods (visualization analytics). Viable social theories should be agentized,
analyzed, and tested with empirical data – from human cognition to international
relations, including fields beyond the five social sciences (linguistics, geography, orga-
nization science, history, communication, law, and others). The complex triadic nexus
among social, artefactual, and natural systems requires computational investigation
within an overall science of complexity, drawing upon existing and new methods from
the social, behavioural, natural, mathematical, and computational sciences.
4 Challenges
Computational social science must be set to answer a number of fundamental scientific
questions, perceived from within the scientific community as pivotal to address and
help manage the BigProblems of society.
4.1 Understand levels and directions of interaction
Levels and directions of interaction are major sources of social complexity. Real-world
societies imply several levels of complexity, which are not reduced to the micro and the
macro levels but include intermediate levels (groups, tribes, networks, communities,
etc.).
Entities belonging to any of these levels interact with one another: individuals
interact with other individuals, groups may conflict with other groups, macro-level
entities need to coordinate with one another (one Ministry with another, the Parlia-
ment with the Government, etc.). But they also interact with entities at any other
levels: group members interact with group artefacts, for example norms, customs,
and habits, and with macro-entities, like justice courts, fiscal agencies, the electoral
system, etc.
Social levels emerge from one another, and retroact on one another. We need to
understand how new levels occur, e.g. how groups and coalitions as well as social
institutions and other macro-entities are formed. But we also need to understand
how these retroact on the produced levels and modify them.
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4.1.1 A new view on emergence
Emergence is much studied, but this does not mean it is well understood. Insufficient
understanding of emergence phenomena depend on several factors: a) insufficient
analysis of the emergence process, b) inadequate models of the micro-level interacting
units from which emergence is supposed to proceed, c) unsatisfactory account of the
coupling of emergence and downward causation: many social phenomena and entities
emerge while at the same time retroact on the lower levels, and it is not possible
to account for one direction of the dynamics without considering the complementary
one. This is the case with both social artefacts, like institutions, and cultural artefacts,
like technologies.
Here we address the first factor, i.e., the necessity for a more detailed and explicit
analysis of the emergence process. Do we really need one? What are the problems
that emergence helps us address? In the next subsection, the second factor (groups
and networks) will be addressed (4.1.2). The third factor of inadequacy of existing
models of emergence will be treated as the Micro-Macro link problem (4.1.3).
What is meant by emergence, and why do we need such a notion? Let us start by a
definition of social emergent processes [64] as phenomena a) for which the conditions
for its occurence are well defined, b) non-deliberately but spontaneously, c) modify-
ing the entities involved, in particular, interfering with their fates but unlike learning,
without modifying the internal states of the producing entities, and d) unlike evolu-
tionary effects, non-transmissible. This definition prevents emergence from collapsing
on the notion of “yet unpredicted events” and allows us to tackle systematic but non-
deliberate processes of social influence that abound in social life and are responsible
for a number of critical social phenomena, from the self-fulfilling prophecy, to social
facilitation, social inertia, stalemates etc. A theoretical understanding of emergence
is particularly important as it often produces paradoxical phenomena where indi-
vidual intentions produce unexpected aggregate results with potentially disastrous
consequences, as in rational herding, free-rider behavior, or unintended ethnic seg-
regation. Typically one expects an emergent social phenomenon to be characterized
by an abrupt collective change that can be well described, in some parameter space,
either in the language of dynamical systems as a bifurcation, or, in the language of
statistical physics as a phase transition.
Emergence is usually seen as a bottom-up process but horizontal emergence occurs
as well. One example is the self-fulfilling prophecy, which is addressed by a great
deal of empirical social psychological studies. In general, a self-fulfilling prophecy
occurs when individuals gradually and non-deliberately tend to assume properties
and behaviours corresponding to the expectations of those with whom they interact.
One interesting question concerns the dual of the self-fulfilling prophecy: it is unclear
whether the mechanism of self-defeating prophecy exists. Finally, a question still open
is whether and under which conditions it is possible to prevent this effect from taking
place.
4.1.2 Networks and group formation
According to the results of the Harvard Symposium on hard social problems in 2010,
one of the top-ten problems is how to achieve good collective behaviour. Unfortu-
nately, a precondition for developing such a theory, namely a model of individual
behaviour is missing. Rationality theory is now deemed to be insufficient. Can we
model emergent collective behaviour without grounding it on a more plausible model
of individual behaviour than is provided by rationality theory?
Two factors prevent modelling the conditions that favour the emergence and pre-
diction of social networks (cf. back to 2.1). First, connections are not allowed to
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emerge from objective relationships, but are either given for granted or created from
agents’ decisions (an example of the latter is the emergence of role differentiation,
[65]). Second, nodes are not modelled as pre-existing entities (agents). Consequently,
it is not possible to predict when a set of entities will generate a network (an exchange
network, a cooperation network, a trust network, a dependence network, etc.). Within
the domain of multiagent systems, based on a more complex view of agency and richer
semantics of their relationships, special type of networks have been shown to emerge
from among heterogeneous agents, characterised by different mental states and action
capacities [66,67]. Interestingly, such networks have been shown to allow for different
types of positive behaviour – one-shot cooperation and exchange – to be predicted
[68]. A system for calculating emergent dependence networks found interesting appli-
cations in organizational design and optimization.
One of the tasks of computational social science is to integrate different inputs from
adjacent fields in a general theory of social networks that accounts for the properties
of existing networks and enables to predict the emergence of new networks.
4.1.3 Multi-level interactions: The Micro-Macro link
The interconnection among different levels of social phenomena [69,70], cannot be
fully accounted for unless multidirectional processes are modelled, including the down-
ward process from higher-level properties to lower level entities, called Micro-Macro
link. More precisely, the Micro-Macro link (see for a recent collection, [71,72]) is the
loop process by which behaviour at the individual level generates higher-level struc-
tures (bottom-up process), which feedback to the lower level (top-down), sometimes
reinforcing the producing behaviour either directly or indirectly [35].
The Micro-Macro link represents a challenge for our new field of science. How to
characterise the whole dynamics? What type of feedback loops does it include? When
and how does a given macro-effect retroact on the lower level entities, giving rise
to the so-called downward causation? Downward causation is a poorly investigated
process, which appears to play a decisive role in many social phenomena. While an
emergent effect is always implemented upon interacting micro-social entities, it is
not necessarily retroacting on them. When does this happen? When is the Micro-
Macro circuit closed? Can we predict the occurrence of a micro-macro loop? Can
we forecast when a certain emergent effect is likely to be reproduced, and what are
the intermediate, or proximate, behavioural or mental causes of its reproduction?
Computational social science is expected to address these questions, not before having
developed an explicit theory of the Micro-Macro link.
4.1.4 Interaction with institutions and compliance
A serious social failure is the breakdown of institutional responsibility that might be
expected to follow from the P2P-driven revival of the Wisdom-of-Crowds culture. As
the production of knowledge becomes decentralised, no definite locus of responsibility
can be traced back and be accountable for the consequences of information spreading.
No matter how frequently Wikipedia is false, and even if it is less frequently so
than the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, who might be blamed and asked to
respond for the false news published within it? Should we expect an increasing social
uncertainty to follow, especially as people feel unable to claim repair for the damages
suffered in consequence of wrong information spreading? In the last couple of decades,
we got ourselves busy with questions concerning the impact of ICT on lifestyles,
interaction patterns, and thought facilitation or impairment. Poor if any attention
Participatory Science and Computing for Our Complex World 337
was paid instead to the way and the extent to which ICT affects the societal artefacts
that govern our social lives, and in particular social institutions, and the related
degree of social trust. Low compliance is known to be one of the main consequences
of the breakdown of institutional responsibility and social trust [73–75]. These issues
need to be addressed by Computational Social Science.
4.2 Modelling culture
The pioneering computational work by Robert Axelrod [76] addressed the problem
of cultural dynamics considering the following question: “if people tend to become
more alike in their beliefs, attitudes and behavior when they interact, why do not all
differences eventually disappear?” He proposed a simple model to explore competi-
tion between globalization and the persistence of cultural diversity. Culture is defined
as a set of individual attributes subject to social influence. The model implements a
mechanism of homophilic interactions and illustrates how an interaction mechanism
of local convergence can generate global polarization (persistence of cultural diver-
sity). However, culturally polarized states have been shown to be unstable against
cultural drift in a fixed social network. Computational modeling has identified new
mechanisms and conditions that can stabilize the persistence of cultural diversity.
Cultural diversity can be understood as a consequence of co-evolving dynamics of
agents and network [77]. The social network evolves in tandem with the collective
action it makes possible – circumstance makes men as much as men make circum-
stance. Cultural diversity is also stabilized when cultural influence is not just exerted
within interpersonal interactions, but when it is rooted in social pressures from local
majorities in actors networks [78]. An additional aspect is that, perhaps surprisingly,
a strong mass media message is known to lead to social polarization, while mass me-
dia is efficient in producing cultural homogeneity in conditions of weak (and local)
broadcast of a message (the power of being subtle, [79]). On the other hand, social
interactions can lead to a cultural globalization in a direction different from the one
broadcasted by mass media, provided that there are long range links in the network
of interactions. Long range links make it possible for collective self-organization to de-
feat external messages. An important challenge is the understanding of the effects of
the new ICT mechanisms of spreading and aggregating information, replacing tradi-
tional mass media, on the polarization-globalization issue: The concept of local social
circle has been changed, and people are no longer passive receivers of information
but sources of information immediately available in a global scale, and simultane-
ously active players in searching and selecting from a large and distributed number
of information sources.
While Axelrod’s model considers several cultural features at the same level, other
computational studies of cultural dynamics isolate a single cultural aspect such as
language [80]. An open question from the standpoint of computational social sciences
is the development of integrative models that incorporate different cultural features
with different dynamical processes at different scales. Hierarchical and multilevel cul-
tural models are needed to take into account the interdependence of cultural features
and the interconnection of cultural dynamics with other social processes.
4.3 Cross-methodological research
Well designed experiments constitute another key ingredient of the advancement of
science. In the case of the social sciences, they will prove invaluable when combined
with simulation work [81]. However, when thinking of large-scale simulations and
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using similarly large-scale data, computational social science is expected to face sev-
eral crucial challenges for new experimental work in integration with the modelling
process:
Design of experiments to test inferences from data. Careful analysis of data should
yield intuitions on human interactions and decision-making, but different sets of data
or even different analysis of the same data may lead to incompatible proposals. Exper-
imental work specifically designed to discriminate between alternatives should allow
choosing among them.
Design of experiments to test simulation predictions, both local and global. An-
other use of experiments relates to the model or models themselves. These models
should lead to predictions both at the micro and at the macro level, possibly involving
the corresponding loop. Validation of the models requires more than comparison with
available data: Models should offer insights which are experimentally testable. Note
also that this is something like a second-order test of conclusions obtained on data.
Protocols for large-scale experiments: there is a need for virtual labs with repeat-
able procedures and controlled environments. however, going beyond working with
dozens of subjects is by no means trivial. For instance, work on experimental game
theory by Grujic et al. [82], showed that handling 169 individuals simultaneously is
extremely difficult, and this is regarded to be close to what can be done. The design
of large-scale (matching that of the data as far as possible) laboratory experiments
aimed at identifying local and global effects presents a unique set of challenges, whose
resolution requires the development of a commonly agreed methodology and accepted
set of tools, possibly including a virtual laboratory and protocols as to how to handle
large numbers of volunteers interacting through ICT media (not to be confused with
experiments on virtual worlds, [83]).
A word is in order regarding the types of questions such experiments could address.
Aside from human behaviour in a fixed social context, in particular decision making
in contexts like trading, cooperating or coordinating, or the problems of information
aggregation, i.e., how individuals learn and adapt from their social circle, which are
of course interesting aspects, experiments should address the formation of the social
interaction framework (be it a network or otherwise). This poses additional problems
for the experimental design in so far as it may need to be prepared in such a way
that it can alter its own context. How to do this in a controllable manner is far from
clear, more so if one wants to make sure that the experiment addresses the question
one is interested in.
4.4 How much complexity of agents is needed to get a good picture?
The discussion so far points to a number of objectives that require higher-level com-
plexity than is allowed by ordinary agent based models of social processes.
First, more mental complexity must be modelled to understand what are the
specific mental properties allowing social complexity to be managed and simplified.
For example, what are the specific properties or mental attitudes required to cooperate
and coordinate with others and give help without aiming to obtain benefits in return?
What is needed for people to be willing to participate in social control, thus leading
to more distributed costs of norm enforcement?
Second, social intelligence makes society work better by creating social artefacts,
both material and immaterial (institutions). Of course, properties of social artefacts
are not necessarily linked to individual properties. Therefore the understanding of the
individual is not always needed to understand them. However, social artefacts share
properties of human producers and users (e.g., limited autonomy, see [84]). If we do
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not understand these properties at the level of human producers and users, we will
not be able to understand them at the level of social artefacts.
Third, the most intelligent use of social power is often not signalled, and not
easily reconstructed. Social intelligence is more than the capacity to represent and
understand the environment. It includes the capacity to represent others’ mental
representations [85], to reason and manipulate these representations and to actively
influence them. Indeed, social power ranges from the exercise of physical strength, to
more subtle and insidious manipulative actions in which humans attempt to modify
one another’s mental states in order to modify one another’s future behaviour. The
manipulative exercise of power consists of keeping one’s intentions hidden to the
target. Consequently, social power, at least its manipulative use, is not signalled.
To understand and predict these fairly complex mechanisms of power, a relatively
complex model of the mind is needed.
Fourth, and consequent, a number of important social phenomena cannot be un-
derstood nor fully taken advantage of, without a more complex model of social intel-
ligence and social influence. One example is reputation [86–88]. Reputational systems
exist in natural societies since the dawn of mankind. They gave inspiration to a spe-
cial technology of reputation extensively exploited in commercial applications on the
Internet. Cross-methodological evidence [89] shows that the inadequate or unsatisfac-
tory results of the technology of reputation are due to an insufficient understanding
of how reputation systems work in natural societies. Analogous considerations apply
to the case of trust [90].
Fifth, policy modelling often necessitates to investigate the mental mechanisms
which are involved in the behaviours to be modified or strengthened. Consider the
role that overconfidence, according to some economists [91], has played in the last
financial crisis. How to modify such an attitude? Would the recommendation to not
trust banks too much do? And what about bad habits, like drinking, smoking, etc.?
Which policies are more likely to succeed in informing diabetics about the benefits
to quit unhealthy diets, or young people avoid unsafe or irresponsible behaviours?
4.5 Towards a new epistemological foundation: What kind of models
do we need?
4.5.1 Understanding and predicting
Models are often used to make predictions, a practice sometimes called forecasting.
In this case, models represent the properties of actual target systems so that we can
predict what these systems will do in the future. The models used for predictive
purposes often tell us something about mechanisms. They are output-oriented since,
for a given set of initial conditions, they should tell us how the state of the system
will evolve in time.
Models can also be used to explain the behaviour or properties of target systems.
Explanation is a highly controversial notion [92]. Consistent with the scientific liter-
ature on modelling, we hold a view of explaining as “showing how things work” [93].
When we build models for explanatory purposes, we try to make adequate repre-
sentations of target systems, similar to the predictive case. However, because there
is a difference in what we use the model for, different properties enable models to
be adequate to their intended use. Unlike predictive uses, which primarily involve
optimizing the models to make their output as accurate and precise as we need it to
be, the explanatory use requires us to learn how the component parts of the target
system give rise to the behaviour of the whole.
There is an additional explanatory use of models, one that is even more remote
from the predictive case. Sometimes we want to understand how hypothetical systems
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work. There is really no analogue to this in the prediction case because in that context
we are interested in predicting the behaviour of actual target systems. Sometimes in
the course of our trying to explain actual target systems, we make comparisons to
hypothetical systems. Fisher famously said that if we want to explain the prevalence
of two sex organisms, we should start by explaining what the biological world would
be like if there were three sexes [94].
As computational social science is a model-based field of science, aiming to both
explain phenomena of interest and predict their evolution, we need to clearly under-
stand the respective implications for model building.
4.5.2 Qualitative analysis. Generative models
Generative models are a third way of doing science, an escape from the deduc-
tive/inductive dichotomy. They allow qualitative analysis to be done in a rigorous
and controllable way. A typical computational generative approach, as was proposed
by Epstein, is agent-based simulation, requiring to:
“situate an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous agents (see also [50])
in a relevant special environment; allow them to interact according to simple local
rules, and thereby generate – or “grow” – the macroscopic regularity from the bottom
up” [95].
This passage raises some objections and requires that some caveats be taken into
account.
First, how to find out the simple local rules? How to avoid ad hoc and aribitrary
explanations? As already observed [96], one criterion has often been used, i.e., choose
the conditions that are sufficient to generate a given effect. However, this leads to
a great deal of alternative options, all of which are to some extent arbitrary. The
construction of plausible generative models is a challenge for the new computational
social science.
Second, the notion of rules needs clarification and revision. Possibly, rules should
be replaced by explicit and theory-founded agent models, whch include not only
decision-making mechanisms but also representations, attitudes, strategies, actions,
motivations, and the like.
4.5.3 Integrate heterogeneous models
The analysis and modelling of large-scale social systems should be supported on three
coordinated legs: collection, production and analysis of data; agent-based simulations;
analytical modelling.
Well-motivated models of agents in interactions may generate unexpected collec-
tive effects that call for mathematical understanding. Conversely, collective effects
predicted from models simple enough to be mathematically analyzed call for numer-
ical tests on more complex (more realistic) multi-agents systems, or empirical vali-
dation through surveys or experiments, whenever this is possible. Modelling requires
to find appropriate compromises between socio-physical realism, and mathematical
simplicity.
With this general goal of understanding and anticipating behaviours of complex
social systems, one needs to develop simplified models, on which the mathematical
analysis can be done. Such models should be able to reproduce the stylized facts
empirically observed. From the analysis of these models, new intuition can be gained,
and more complex models can be studied, both numerically and analytically (see
[97]). Scenarios can be explored and tested by the large-scale simulations, providing
results that can be used for decision making.
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In the case of collective phenomena (crowds, pedestrian and auto traffic, fashion,
financial or social crisis, opinion formation and epidemic propagation; see [81,98], the
goal of modelling, with analytical and numerical means, is precisely to understand
the global (‘macroscopic’) level from the characteristics of the constitutive elements
(the ‘microscopic’ level) and the social structures they belong to, and also to under-
stand how the collective level influences the individual behaviour. Such modelling can,
and should, be done with multiple approaches, integrating tools and concepts from
different disciplines: applied mathematics, statistical physics, computer science, the-
oretical economics (some relevant keywords would be: partial differential equations,
optimal control theory, information theory, dynamical systems, statistical physics of
disordered systems, graph theory, game theory, numerical simulations, agent-based
systems), and this in close interaction and collaboration with social scientists.
At the interface between data analysis and modelling, the analysis of data may
allow us to reveal robust statistical features that are characteristic of the system under
study. A particular example is the empirical analysis of the network structure, in
different contexts (networks of co-authorships, inter-bank network, road networks...).
A stylized fact observed for a particular system (e.g. a small-world structure) becomes
a guide for the modeller – either this particular network structure is an input to
the model, or one of the goal of the model is to understand how such structure
emerges. Developing new data analysis tools, as well as specific data representation
and visualization tools, is thus an important component of the computational social
approach.
5 Expected impact
5.1 Impact on science
The impact of progress along the above lines on science cannot be overstated. To
begin with, sociology in particular and the social sciences in general would undergo
a dramatic paradigm shift, arising from the incorporation of the scientific method
of physical sciences. Thus, the combination of the computational approach with a
sensible use of experiment will bring the social sciences closer to establishing a well-
ground link between theory and empirical facts and research. Such links should inform
all sciences in which human behaviour is the main object of research or interest, and
should solve incompatibilities such as economics relying on the rational actor picture
and sociology and social psychology outright rejecting it; on the other hand, the latter
rely much more on facts (identified from experiments, surveys, etc.) than traditional
economics, based on the strength of purely abstract analytical approaches (for much
more on this, see [99]). Computational social science would be a major factor toward
this paradigm change in the social sciences.
On the other hand, the impact of the research we have described would certainly
go beyond the social sciences, as it would provide new tools and methods that would
be applicable in any instances where BigData are a key ingredient. As we expect
that new analytical approaches will be developed along with algorithms and monitor-
ing procedures for massive data, the complex systems perspective we propose here,
in which entities and their interactions might be abstract and arise in any context,
would immediately lead to applications of our findings in fields ranging from physics
to ecology through systems biology. In fact, the complex systems approach that tran-
spires through the entire proposal is a crucial lever towards blurring the dividing
lines among disciplines and creating a truly interdisciplinary, non-compartmental
science [100].
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5.2 Impact on technology and competitiveness
Computational social science requires an enormous research effort on ICT, the pil-
lar on which the research directions summarized here rely. Collecting, transmitting,
analysing, simulating and incorporating data to simulations will require computa-
tional and communication capabilities well beyond the current state of the art facil-
ities. While the EU research community on ICT is very active, a scientific program
like the one discussed in this paper would boost it to take over the US and Japan
advantage on this field, thus increasing the competitiveness of the EU as a result and
advancing technology on a world level.
5.3 Impact on society
The role of computational social science is a leading one in addressing the BigProblems
of society, avoiding crises and threats to its stability and healthy development.
Computational social science will provide many tools towards achieving this goal,
and will play a leading role in the successful execution of the project. The development
of Computational Social Science, as proposed in this manifesto, will make it possible to
model and simulate social processes on a global scale, allowing us to take full account
of the long distance interdependencies that characterise today’s heavily interconnected
world. The output of these simulations will be used to support policy makers in their
decision making, to enable them to efficiently and effectively identify optimal paths
for our society. Similarly, open access to these large scale simulations will support
individuals in their evaluation of different policy options in the light of their personal
needs and goals, greatly enhancing citizen participation in this decision process. These
developments together open the doors to a much safer, more sustainable and fairer
global society.
6 Conclusions
There is an increasing realization of the enormous potential of data-driven compu-
tational social science [9]. The availability of unprecedented amounts of data about
human interactions in different social spheres or environments opens the possibility
of using those data to leverage knowledge about social behaviour beyond research on
the scale of tens of people. The data can be used to check and validate the results of
simulation models and socio-economic theories, but a further step in using them is to
take them into account already at the modelling stage.
At the same time, the relation between social simulation (e.g., agent based mod-
elling) and theoretical understanding is still problematic. Thus, simulations must be
accompanied by micro-macro-loop theories, i.e., theories of mechanisms at the indi-
vidual level that affect the global behavior, and theories of loop-closing downward
effects or second-order emergence.
In view of this, it is clear that naive or brute-force incorporation of large-scale
data into simulation models may not lead to the expected results in terms of achiev-
ing relevant progress in social science. While it is apparent that the analysis of the
data will certainly contribute to the understanding of mechanisms, it is also clear that
further input will often be needed, in particular input obtained from experiments un-
der controlled parameters or situations. These will shed light on the decision-making
mechanisms that sometimes can be obscured among the midst of the data.
In conclusion, computational social science, as a rapidly developing and successful
field, needs to be aware of the necessity to develop its theoretical premises, and to
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test them. Much as physical theories and models are tested through incredibly large
experiments (such as the LHC at the CERN), progress in computational models of
social phenomena will only be possible by a sensible combination of data input, ex-
perimental work, and theory devising. Computational social science requires brings
along challenging demands on the experimental side, in terms of design and proce-
dures, which can only be solved by working together with the computational science
community.
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